Can Old “Parental Alienation” Findings Be Reopened? Re SB [2026] EWFC 264 Explained

Family law can change. Guidance can improve. Professional practice can move on. But that does not automatically make an old Family Court finding disappear.

That is the central lesson from Re SB (A Child) (Alienating Behaviour: Application to Reopen Findings) [2026] EWFC 264.

In 2020, a judge found that a mother had psychologically manipulated her daughter into rejecting her father. The court transferred the child’s care immediately from the mother to the father.

Six years later, after the Family Justice Council published major new guidance on children’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to see a parent — and after the President of the Family Division set out the “modern approach” in Re Y [2026] EWFC 38 — the mother returned to court.

She argued that the old findings should now be set aside.

The application failed.

In this article

• What happened in Re SB
• Why the mother wanted the 2020 findings reopened
• What Re Y changed about alienating-behaviour cases
• The three-stage modern approach
• The legal test for reopening Family Court findings
• Why reopening is not an appeal by another route
• The difference between a children’s guardian and an expert witness
• Why the court did not retrospectively exclude the earlier professional evidence
• Why the mother’s application ultimately failed
• What the case means for parents with historic “parental alienation” findings
• Why SB’s present wishes and feelings still mattered

Case snapshot

What had happened to SB?

The parents separated in 2015.

A shared-care arrangement was initially put in place.

By 2019, however, the relationship between SB and her father had deteriorated significantly.

SB had reported incidents involving her father, including an occasion when he pushed her head into a pillow and another when he drove away before she had secured her seatbelt.

The mother restricted contact and made referrals to the police and local authority.

She also later raised allegations of domestic abuse.

The court investigated the factual background.

Some findings were made against the father.

The judge found that he had used excessive force when pushing SB’s head into the pillow and had been careless in relation to the seatbelt incident.

But the judge did not consider those incidents sufficient to explain SB’s eventual wholesale rejection of him.

The court was also concerned about the mother’s conduct.

Among other matters, the earlier judge considered the way the mother had questioned SB about her father, her response to contact, the handling of gifts and communications, and whether her own negative view of the father was influencing the child.

By December 2020, the court found that SB’s rejection of her father had been caused by psychological manipulation by the mother.

The result was profound.

SB was transferred immediately from her mother’s care to her father’s care.

There was then an initial period of no contact with the mother.

Why did the mother return to court six years later?

By 2026, the legal and professional landscape around so-called “parental alienation” had changed significantly.

The Family Justice Council had published detailed guidance on children who are reluctant, resistant or refusing to spend time with a parent.

Then, in February 2026, the President of the Family Division handed down Re Y (Experts and Alienating Behaviour: The Modern Approach) [2026] EWFC 38.

The mother argued that the approach used in her 2020 case did not comply with the methodology now regarded as appropriate.

She also challenged the role played by:

• the children’s guardian in the earlier proceedings; and
• Dr Jennifer Matthews, a forensic psychologist who had been instructed as a Part 25 expert.

Her essential case was that the professional analysis and the eventual judicial findings had been reached using an approach that could not now be regarded as sound.

She therefore sought to have the old findings reopened and set aside.

What changed with the Family Justice Council guidance and Re Y?

The modern approach rejects the idea that a child’s rejection of a parent can itself be treated as evidence that another parent has “alienated” them.

The Family Justice Council expressly states that “parental alienation syndrome has no evidential basis”.

That does not mean that a parent can never manipulate a child against another parent.

It means the court has to identify the actual behaviour, investigate competing explanations and determine causation through evidence rather than diagnosis or label.

A child may be reluctant or refusing contact for many reasons.

The child’s response might be:

• a justified reaction to abuse or harmful parenting;
• a protective or traumatic response;
• the product of ordinary relationship difficulties;
• the result of attachment, alignment or affinity;
• the consequence of parental conflict;
• or, in some cases, the result of manipulative behaviour by another parent.

The court should not jump from:

“The child rejects Parent A”

to:

“Parent B must have caused it.”

The modern approach: three questions before finding alienating behaviour

This sequence is important because otherwise a child’s fear, anger or refusal may be interpreted backwards.

A response to harmful behaviour could wrongly be treated as evidence of manipulation.

Equally, the existence of allegations of abuse cannot automatically prevent the court from investigating evidence that a child’s relationship with a safe parent may have been deliberately undermined.

The answer is not the label. The answer is the factual analysis.

So why didn’t Re Y automatically undo the 2020 findings?

Because Re SB was not an appeal against the 2020 judgment.

The mother was asking the Family Court to reopen findings of fact that had already been determined.

That has its own legal test.

The fact that a case might be managed differently today does not necessarily mean that the underlying findings were wrong.

HHJ Stephen Smith therefore had to look beyond differences in terminology and procedure.

He had to ask whether there were proper grounds for believing that the actual findings themselves required reconsideration.

What is the legal test for reopening findings of fact?

The judgment applied the established approach from Re CTD (A Child: Rehearing) [2020] EWCA Civ 1316.

Re SB never got beyond stage one.

The judge was not satisfied that there were sufficient grounds to reopen the findings.

Why doesn’t the court simply reconsider an old finding whenever new guidance appears?

Because there is another important principle in litigation:

At some point, factual disputes need to come to an end.

The courts therefore have to balance competing considerations.

The court therefore asks whether there is something substantial enough to justify disturbing the earlier decision.

That might include genuinely new evidence, information casting real doubt upon the original finding, or another proper reason why the finding can no longer safely stand.

The jurisdiction exists to prevent injustice.

But it is not a mechanism for simply re-running a case because another judge might now approach it differently.

Reopening findings is different from appealing a judgment

This is one of the most practically important parts of Re SB.

An appeal asks whether the original decision was legally or procedurally wrong.

A reopening application asks whether there is now a sufficient basis for previously determined facts to be reconsidered.

Those are different exercises.

This matters for litigants in person because using the wrong procedural route can fundamentally weaken an otherwise legitimate concern.

The mother also challenged the earlier professional evidence

The 2020 court had relied on evidence from two different types of professional.

The first was the children’s guardian.

The second was Dr Jennifer Matthews, who had been appointed as a Part 25 forensic psychology expert.

The mother argued that their earlier analysis should now be reconsidered in light of Re Y.

HHJ Stephen Smith rejected the attempt to retrospectively re-decide the earlier admissibility decisions.

That produced an important clarification.

A children’s guardian is not the same thing as an expert witness

This is easy to misunderstand.

A children’s guardian may bring substantial professional experience to proceedings.

They may assess the child, analyse welfare issues and make recommendations.

But legally their evidence is not Part 25 expert evidence.

Practice Direction 25B expressly distinguishes a children’s guardian from an expert.

In Re SB, the judge held that the Part 18 application was not an appropriate mechanism for retrospectively trying to determine that the former guardian’s reports should never have been admitted as expert evidence.

They were not expert evidence in the first place.

What about the psychologist?

Dr Matthews was different.

She had been appointed as a Part 25 expert.

She was an HCPC-registered and BPS-chartered forensic psychologist.

Her reports included discussion of “parental alienation” and research said to describe characteristics associated with an alienating parent and an alienated child.

The mother criticised that methodology by reference to the much more structured modern approach in Re Y.

But Re SB did not simply ask:

“Would this expert report be written exactly the same way today?”

The more important question was:

Did the earlier judge nevertheless make the relevant factual findings herself, on an adequate factual foundation?

Why did the mother’s application fail?

The court went back through the earlier judgments in detail.

That exercise mattered.

There had already been a fact-finding judgment in June 2020.

The judge had made findings about the father’s behaviour.

She had also examined the seriousness of those incidents and whether they explained SB’s rejection of him.

The earlier judge had separately made findings about the mother’s own conduct.

These included her questioning of SB, her presentation of the father, her response to contact, gifts and communication, and the extent to which her attitude was influencing the child.

By the final welfare judgment, the judge was therefore not simply accepting a professional diagnosis that:

“The child rejects the father, therefore the mother has alienated her.”

There was a factual foundation beneath the conclusion.

HHJ Stephen Smith considered that foundation sufficiently consistent with the principles that now underpin the modern approach.

The fact that the language, sequencing or professional methodology might be different today did not establish that the ultimate findings needed to be reopened.

New guidance does not automatically invalidate old judgments

This is probably the single most important sentence to take away from Re SB.

A development in case law or professional guidance may give a parent a reason to look again at an old case.

But it does not automatically establish that the findings were wrong.

You still need to examine:

• what findings were actually made;
• what facts supported them;
• whether domestic abuse allegations were determined;
• whether alternative explanations for the child’s behaviour were considered;
• what role professional evidence played;
• whether the judge made the key decisions independently;
• whether there is new evidence;
• and whether there is a real reason to believe the findings would now be different.

The exercise is forensic, not rhetorical.

What Re SB does not mean

What should you look for if you believe old findings were wrongly made?

Start with the actual judgment.

Not your memory of the hearing.

Not the other parent’s description of what happened.

Not simply the final order.

The judgment.

Then work through the reasoning carefully.

For litigants in person: do not start with “the law has changed”

That argument is usually too broad.

A more useful structure is:

That is far stronger than simply saying:

“Re Y says parental alienation was wrong, so my old judgment should be overturned.”

That is not what Re Y says.

And Re SB now makes the limits of that argument particularly clear.

Professional evidence: separate observation, analysis and fact

Re SB also reinforces something that matters far beyond alienating-behaviour cases.

Professional reports often contain several different types of material:

• facts reported by a parent;
• facts reported by a child;
• the professional’s own observations;
• professional analysis;
• expert opinion;
• recommendations; and
• sometimes assumptions about disputed events.

Those categories should not be blurred together.

A report saying:

“Mother has alienated the child”

is very different from evidence showing:

“On these dates, the following specific behaviours occurred; these behaviours had these observable effects; competing explanations were considered; and the court has made the following factual findings.”

The second approach makes the reasoning visible.

That is exactly what courts need in cases where the consequences can include transfer of a child’s home.

Re SB and Re Y should be read together

Re Y tells us how allegations of alienating behaviour should now be approached.

Re SB answers the next obvious question:

What happens to findings made before that modern approach was clearly articulated?

The answer is not:

“They all stand.”

Nor is it:

“They all fall.”

The court has to examine the individual judgment and determine whether there are proper grounds for reopening the findings.

That is a much more demanding exercise than comparing old terminology with new terminology.

The child’s present welfare still mattered

There is another important part of Re SB which could easily be lost in the procedural argument.

SB was no longer the primary-school-aged child she had been when the earlier proceedings were decided.

She was now a teenager.

Her life had moved on considerably.

She remained living with her father and was reported to be thriving.

By the end of the 2026 proceedings, she had begun remote direct contact with her mother.

The mother asked for further welfare work to be directed concerning their relationship.

The judge declined.

He considered SB’s current age, development and wishes and feelings important to how that relationship should now progress.

The court did not consider that further judicial management would produce sufficient welfare benefit.

That closely connects with another recent JSH Law case analysis:

15-Year-Old Refuses Contact: Court Discharges Child Arrangements Order →

What if your child is refusing contact now?

Do not automatically translate refusal into either:

“The other parent has alienated the child.”

or:

“The child’s wishes end the enquiry.”

Both can be dangerous shortcuts.

The better questions are:

• When did the child’s position change?
• What was the relationship like before that?
• What reasons has the child given?
• Are those reasons consistent?
• Has domestic abuse or harmful parenting been alleged or found?
• Could the child’s reaction be justified?
• Could other developmental or relational factors explain it?
• Has another adult behaved in ways that have affected the relationship?
• What does the independent evidence show?
• What arrangement now promotes the child’s welfare?

Read: When a Child Says “I Don’t Want Contact” →

What if domestic abuse and alienating behaviour are both alleged?

This is precisely where sequencing matters.

The court should not decide that a parent has alienated a child without properly considering whether domestic abuse or harmful behaviour explains the child’s reaction.

Where findings are necessary, the underlying factual issues need to be determined.

Only then can the court safely assess whether a child’s reluctance is:

• an appropriate response to what they experienced;
• a protective or traumatic response;
• explained by another relationship factor;
• or caused by manipulative behaviour from another parent.

The purpose of that sequence is not to favour mothers or fathers.

It is to avoid mistaking cause for consequence.

Read JSH Law’s fact-finding and PD12J guidance →

The bigger lesson: labels are not evidence

“Alienating parent.”

“Protective parent.”

“Rejected parent.”

“Abusive parent.”

These descriptions can become enormously powerful inside family proceedings.

Sometimes the evidence supports clear findings.

But the label should come after the evidence — not replace it.

The court still needs to identify:

• what happened;
• when it happened;
• who did what;
• what the child experienced;
• what competing explanations exist;
• what the evidence establishes;
• and what follows for welfare.

Re SB is ultimately an evidence case as much as it is an alienating-behaviour case.

The mother’s application failed because the court did not simply compare the vocabulary of 2020 with the vocabulary of 2026.

It looked underneath the terminology and examined the actual factual reasoning.

That is the right discipline.

If you are considering asking the Family Court to reopen findings

Before filing anything, assemble:

• the judgment containing the findings;
• the sealed order resulting from it;
• any earlier fact-finding judgment;
• the schedule of allegations, if one existed;
• professional reports relied upon;
• expert reports relied upon;
• relevant transcripts where available;
• any appeal decision or refusal of permission to appeal;
• the evidence or information now said to undermine the finding;
• and evidence showing why that finding remains significant today.

Then prepare a focused chronology.

The issue is not simply everything that has happened since separation.

The court needs to understand:

finding → evidential basis → subsequent development → reason to doubt finding → present consequence.

JSH Law: Family Court Evidence & Chronology Help →

Questions to ask before making a reopening application

My view: Re SB is a warning against two opposite mistakes

The first mistake would be to treat old findings as sacred simply because a judge once made them.

Family Courts can reopen findings where there is a proper basis to do so.

That safeguard matters.

Children should not have their futures determined indefinitely by factual findings that later evidence demonstrates were wrong.

But the opposite mistake would be to assume that every development in guidance automatically destroys the validity of earlier cases.

That would create its own injustice.

Families could repeatedly reopen historic litigation whenever professional terminology or best practice evolved.

Re SB insists upon something harder and more useful:

That is a much more reliable approach than fighting over labels.

The final welfare question remains the child

Perhaps the most human part of the judgment comes at the end.

The 2026 proceedings were about events and findings dating back years.

But SB had continued growing up while the adults and the legal system debated them.

She was now a teenager.

She had begun rebuilding communication with her mother.

The court decided not to impose further welfare intervention.

Her relationship with her mother would develop in accordance with her own wishes and feelings.

That does not erase the past.

But it recognises something family proceedings can sometimes lose sight of:

The purpose of determining history is to make better decisions for the child’s future.

Related JSH Law guidance

Case and legal sources

• Re SB (A Child) (Alienating Behaviour: Application to Reopen Findings) [2026] EWFC 264.
• Re Y (Experts and Alienating Behaviour: The Modern Approach) [2026] EWFC 38.
• Family Justice Council, Guidance on responding to a child’s unexplained reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent and allegations of alienating behaviour.
• Re CTD (A Child: Rehearing) [2020] EWCA Civ 1316.
• Re E (Children: Reopening Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1447.
• Re B (Children Act Proceedings: Issue Estoppel) [1997] Fam 117.
• Family Procedure Rules 2010, Part 18.
• Family Procedure Rules 2010, Part 25 and Practice Direction 25B.

Published judgment: Re SB [2026] EWFC 264

Re Y: Re Y [2026] EWFC 38

Family Justice Council guidance: Guidance on alienating behaviour and children’s reluctance, resistance or refusal

Family Procedure Rules Part 18: Procedure for other applications in proceedings

Practice Direction 25B: Duties of experts and expert reports

Legal and procedural information checked: 29 September 2026.