The short answer

A carefully designed public convictions database could give some people an earlier warning about a partner’s proven history of domestic abuse. But it would capture only a fraction of abusive behaviour. It should supplement—not replace—Clare’s Law, specialist safety planning, effective enforcement and active management of serial or high-risk perpetrators.

Does the UK have a public domestic abuse register?

No single publicly searchable domestic abuse convictions register operates across the UK. In England and Wales, the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme—commonly known as Clare’s Law—allows police to make a targeted disclosure where information indicates that somebody may be at risk from a current or former partner. Unlike a convictions-only database, police may consider convictions, allegations, cases which did not proceed, intelligence and patterns of concerning behaviour.

Imagine discovering, only after you have moved in with somebody, become financially dependent upon them or had a child together, that they have previously been convicted of abusing a partner.

The record existed. The court knew. The police knew. It may even have been technically available somewhere within a public court system. But you did not know where to look, which name to search, which county held the record or what the legal description of the offence meant.

That is the problem Volusia County in Florida is trying to address.

The instinct behind the decision is understandable. Domestic abuse often depends upon secrecy, fragmentation and impression management. A person may conceal previous convictions, minimise past conduct or tell each new partner that every former partner was dishonest, unstable or vindictive.

A searchable official record can interrupt that narrative. It can place verified information into the hands of somebody who may otherwise be making life-changing decisions without it.

But a register also creates difficult questions. Who should be included? How long should a name remain visible? What happens when records are wrong or a conviction is overturned? How do we avoid identifying victims indirectly? Most importantly, how do we stop “no result” being interpreted as “no risk”?

What has Volusia County approved?

On 21 July 2026, Volusia County Council voted by six votes to one to create what will become Florida’s first county-operated Domestic Violence Offender Database.

The original proposal focused on people with two or more domestic violence convictions. During the meeting, the Council amended that threshold so that the database will also cover a person with a single qualifying conviction. It also agreed that qualifying convictions from the preceding ten years should be included.

The database is not yet operational. County staff are now working with the Clerk of the Circuit Court to develop it, and an anticipated launch date has not yet been announced.

According to Volusia County’s official announcement , the database will consolidate existing public-record information about qualifying domestic or dating violence convictions. It is intended to synchronise regularly with the Clerk’s case-management system.

Information displayed is expected to include:

• the convicted person’s full legal name;
• date of birth;
• the most recent qualifying booking photograph;
• applicable case numbers;
• references to the relevant Florida statutes; and
• offence dates.

Victims’ details are not intended to form part of the public database.

The information is already available in public court records, but that does not make it practically accessible. Court systems can be fragmented, searches can be confusing and the legal significance of an offence may not be obvious to somebody without specialist knowledge.

A properly designed database could turn scattered court data into information an ordinary person can find and understand. That could help somebody investigate the background of a new partner or a person being considered as a carer for a vulnerable family member.

But it will remain a record of qualifying convictions—not a certificate of safety for everybody whose name does not appear.

The Tennessee model behind the Florida decision

Volusia County’s proposal was influenced by Tennessee’s “Savanna’s Law”. That law created a statewide public registry of persistent domestic violence offenders maintained by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation.

Tennessee’s threshold is narrower than the final Volusia County approach. Registration is triggered where a person is convicted of an offence committed against a domestic abuse victim and has at least one previous conviction for an offence against a domestic abuse victim.

The public Tennessee registry may include identifying information such as the person’s name, date of birth, conviction date, county or counties of conviction and photograph. It does not publish the person’s address, social security number, driving-licence number or other state or federal identification number.

The Tennessee legislation also uses different registration periods according to the number of previous convictions. It applies to relevant offences occurring on or after 1 January 2026, although the earlier conviction used to establish persistent offending need not have occurred after that date.

That distinction matters. Volusia County has chosen a broader entry threshold—one qualifying conviction—and a retrospective ten-year search period. It has therefore moved beyond merely copying Tennessee’s persistent-offender model.

What does England and Wales have instead?

England and Wales does not currently operate a public, searchable domestic abuse convictions register.

The principal disclosure mechanism is the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme, widely known as Clare’s Law. It was rolled out nationally in 2014 and its guidance was placed on a statutory footing through section 77 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.

Clare’s Law has two routes:

This is not a general right to obtain somebody else’s criminal record. Police must consider whether disclosure is necessary, reasonable and proportionate to protect a person from harm. The decision must comply with the applicable common-law principles, data-protection law and human-rights law.

Importantly, the police assessment is not restricted to convictions. The statutory guidance permits consideration of convictions, allegations, cases which did not proceed, intelligence about previous violent or abusive offending, patterns of stalking or coercive control and concerning behaviour towards the current person at risk.

That makes Clare’s Law potentially more informative than a convictions-only public register. It can bring together a wider picture and deliver information with a risk assessment and safety planning.

The maximum suggested timescale for completing a DVDS investigation is 28 days, unless an extension is required and justified by exceptional circumstances. Where an immediate or imminent risk is identified, safeguarding action should not wait for the ordinary process to finish.

Clare’s Law is not operating consistently

The difficulty is the gap between the scheme on paper and its delivery in practice.

The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has reported wide variations between police forces, inconsistent decision-making, failures to follow the guidance and underuse of the proactive Right to Know route. The Commissioner also found that disclosures are not always delivered sensitively or with adequate information about support and next steps.

The Government’s 2026 violence and abuse action plan expressly acknowledges that more must be done to make Clare’s Law work for victims and survivors. It promises a clearer and more consistent framework, a review of operational barriers and a digital tool to support police disclosure decisions.

Those improvements are welcome, but they are also an admission that access to potentially life-saving information still depends too heavily on where a person lives and how effectively their local force operates the scheme.

Public register, Clare’s Law or active perpetrator management?

These are not interchangeable systems. They perform different jobs.

A public register can help somebody make an informed decision. Clare’s Law can provide a fuller, targeted disclosure. Active perpetrator management is intended to make agencies take responsibility for reducing the danger.

A credible national response requires all three functions: accessible information, safe disclosure and active risk management.

The case for a public domestic abuse register

1. It could provide an early warning

Domestic abuse perpetrators can be extremely skilled at impression management. A new partner may initially see charm, attentiveness and apparent vulnerability. Previous relationships may be described as involving a “crazy ex”, a false allegation or a former partner who supposedly turned the children against them.

An official record can cut through that narrative. It gives the potential victim something independent against which to assess what they are being told.

2. It recognises patterns rather than isolated incidents

Domestic abuse is frequently pattern-based. The criminal justice system, however, can process each assault, threat, breach or report as a separate event. A register of repeat convictions can make part of the pattern visible.

That is particularly important where the perpetrator moves from one relationship to another, leaving each victim with only part of the overall picture.

3. It returns some information to the person facing the risk

Too often, agencies know more about the danger than the person living with it. There may be previous police call-outs, protective orders, convictions, probation involvement or information held across different regions.

A public database challenges the assumption that information about proven convictions should remain difficult to find until a potential victim knows enough to ask the right agency the right question.

4. It could make public information genuinely accessible

“It is already public” is not a complete answer. Information scattered across unfamiliar court systems, filed under technical offence descriptions or divided between areas may be functionally inaccessible to an ordinary person.

A central database can reduce the practical and digital barriers between a person and information that may affect their safety.

5. It sends a public message about accountability

Domestic abuse is still minimised as a private relationship problem. A formal public record makes clear that a domestic abuse conviction is a serious public-protection matter with consequences extending beyond the immediate sentence.

The serious limitations of a convictions-only register

1. Most domestic abuse never results in a conviction

This is the central problem.

The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has reported that fewer than one in five victims and survivors report to the police. Even after a report, a case may not lead to arrest, charge, prosecution or conviction.

A University of Essex study reported that only 4.4% of domestic abuse perpetrators receive convictions. A register restricted to convicted offenders would therefore capture only a small fraction of those causing harm.

2. It risks creating false reassurance

A person may search a new partner’s name, find nothing and assume that the relationship is safe. But the individual may have been reported without charge, convicted in another jurisdiction, used a different name, moved between areas or never previously come to police attention.

A county-level database is especially vulnerable to geographical gaps unless it is linked effectively with records from other counties and states.

A register can only confirm the information it contains. It cannot certify good character and it cannot predict future behaviour.

3. A list does not manage the risk

Publishing a name does not monitor an offender, enforce an order, prevent contact, challenge coercive behaviour or respond to a breach.

There is a danger that governments announce a register, present it as decisive action and leave underfunded police, probation and domestic abuse services struggling with the same operational failures.

Information is useful. Information without enforcement is not protection.

4. Disclosure can increase danger

A victim who discovers a partner’s previous convictions may confront them or attempt to leave. An abusive person who believes they are losing control may escalate their behaviour.

Clare’s Law at least requires consideration of how, when and where information should be disclosed and what support should accompany it. A person searching a public website may receive life-changing information while alone, without a safety plan and potentially on a device monitored by the perpetrator.

5. The burden must not be transferred to victims

No victim should later be asked, “Why did you not check the register?” or “Why did you stay after finding out?”

People stay in abusive relationships for complex and rational reasons: fear, financial dependence, housing, immigration status, concern for children, disability, isolation, threats, surveillance and the genuine risk associated with leaving.

A register must increase institutional responsibility, not become another mechanism for judging a victim’s decisions.

6. Accuracy, identification and due process matter

Names and dates of birth can be similar. Records can contain errors. Convictions can be overturned. People may change their names or use aliases.

Any public system would require reliable identity matching, clear definitions, correction and appeal procedures, appropriate removal periods and prompt updates following an overturned conviction.

It must also consider the risk of identifying a victim indirectly, particularly in small communities or widely reported cases, even where the victim’s name is formally excluded.

7. Victims themselves can be criminalised

Domestic abuse cases do not always enter the criminal justice system in a neat form. A victim may be arrested following a retaliatory allegation, may use force while defending themselves or may accept a plea under pressure.

That does not justify secrecy about properly proved offending. It does mean that any register needs safeguards, accurate contextual classification and a meaningful procedure for challenging wrongful inclusion.

8. Privacy and rehabilitation cannot simply be ignored

Public protection may justify disclosing relevant information, but an open-ended public record engages legitimate questions about privacy, rehabilitation, spent convictions, proportionality and data protection.

In England and Wales, any proposed register would need a clear legislative basis and carefully defined rules about qualifying offences, duration, access, accuracy, review and removal. It would also have to be designed consistently with the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, the Data Protection Act 2018 and applicable human-rights principles.

Volusia County chose one conviction—not two

The original proposal would have required at least two qualifying domestic violence convictions. The Council ultimately decided that one conviction should be enough for inclusion.

The argument is straightforward: requiring two convictions means waiting for a further offence, potentially involving another victim, before making the first conviction readily visible.

But conviction numbers alone do not necessarily measure risk. One conviction for an extremely serious offence may indicate greater danger than two convictions for less serious conduct.

A proper risk assessment must also examine escalation, stalking, strangulation, threats to kill, obsessive behaviour, access to weapons, separation, coercive control and repeated breaches of protective orders.

My view is that agencies should never wait for a second conviction before assessing and managing somebody who presents a serious risk.

For public listing, the legal criteria must remain precise, evidence-based and subject to appropriate correction and review procedures. Relevant non-conviction intelligence should remain available for lawful targeted disclosure and professional risk management rather than being published indiscriminately.

What should England and Wales do?

We should pay attention to what is happening in Florida and Tennessee, but we should not simply copy a public list and call the safeguarding problem solved.

1. Make Clare’s Law work consistently

There should be a simple national application route, clear urgent procedures, compliance with the 28-day maximum timescale unless a justified extension is necessary and proper oversight of forces that repeatedly delay or refuse appropriate disclosures.

The Right to Know must be genuinely proactive. A victim should not have to discover that Clare’s Law exists and make the perfect application before police consider warning them.

2. Create national, intelligence-led perpetrator management

The priority should be identifying and managing high-risk, high-harm and serial perpetrators across police-force boundaries.

That requires police, probation, courts, local authorities, health services and specialist domestic abuse organisations to share relevant information lawfully and act upon it. A person’s risk should not disappear because they move to another area or begin a relationship with somebody new.

3. Join up court and police systems

The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has highlighted gaps between court databases and police systems. Police are not always automatically notified when protective orders are made and served.

That is a fundamental safeguarding failure. A person reporting a breach during a crisis should not be required to prove the existence of an order because public agencies have failed to share it.

4. Enforce protective measures

Bail conditions, non-molestation orders, restraining orders and domestic abuse protection measures are only meaningful if breaches trigger a prompt and effective response.

A database which records yesterday’s conviction cannot compensate for failing to act on today’s breach.

5. Build support around disclosure

Information should be accompanied by specialist safety planning, housing advice, legal information, immigration advice where necessary and support for affected children.

The objective is not simply to tell somebody that they are at risk. It is to help them become safer.

6. Measure outcomes, not searches

Any register or disclosure system should be independently evaluated. Success cannot be measured by the number of names published or website searches performed.

We need to know whether disclosures were timely, whether victims received support, whether further harm was prevented, whether breaches were enforced and whether high-risk perpetrators were actively managed.

7. Consider a carefully limited public register as one part of the system

There is a principled case for making specified domestic abuse convictions easier to find, particularly where the information is already public but practically inaccessible.

Any proposal for England and Wales should be developed with survivors, specialist services, police, probation, data-protection experts and justice professionals. It would require clear qualifying criteria, strong identity safeguards, a correction and appeal process, defined retention periods, warnings about the limits of the data and immediate routes to confidential support.

What if you are concerned about a current or former partner?

You do not need to wait for physical violence, a conviction or a crisis before seeking help.

• Trust patterns, not promises. Repeated monitoring, intimidation, isolation, financial restriction, threats, humiliation and pressure can form part of domestic abuse even where there has been no assault.
• Consider making a Clare’s Law application. You can contact the police under the Right to Ask. A relative, friend or relevant professional may also raise concerns, although any disclosure will usually be made to the person at risk or somebody best placed to protect them.
• Do not treat a blank check as proof of safety. Continue to take your own experience, warning signs and the wider pattern seriously.
• Do not confront somebody about information if doing so may increase risk. Seek specialist safety advice first and plan any separation carefully.
• Preserve evidence safely. Keep a chronology, messages, photographs, police reference numbers, medical evidence, details of witnesses and copies of relevant orders somewhere the perpetrator cannot access.
• Use a safe device where possible. Consider location sharing, linked accounts, cloud access, browser history, password access and monitoring software.
• Seek urgent protection where necessary. Depending on the circumstances, protective options may include police safeguarding measures, a non-molestation order, an occupation order, bail conditions or a restraining order. Contact emergency services if there is immediate danger.

Frequently asked questions

Conclusion

Volusia County’s decision deserves attention because it rejects the idea that a proven history of domestic abuse should remain buried in difficult-to-navigate court records.

The approved database could help some people identify risk earlier. I support its development as an additional warning tool, provided it includes strong accuracy safeguards, clear explanations of its limitations and direct routes to confidential support.

But it cannot be the centrepiece of domestic abuse prevention.

By the time somebody has accumulated even one conviction, the system may already have failed a victim and their children. Where a register requires repeat offending, it may be waiting for further harm before making the pattern readily visible.

The real task is to identify patterns sooner, share information lawfully, warn people safely, manage those presenting serious risk and enforce protective measures when they are breached.

The lesson for England and Wales is not simply that we need more names on a public list. It is that information about risk must reach the right person at the right time—and that public authorities must then take responsibility for acting upon it.

Do you need help presenting a pattern of domestic abuse clearly?

JSH Law provides practical, evidence-led support to people navigating family proceedings, domestic abuse allegations and safeguarding concerns. I can help with chronologies, evidence organisation, witness statements, schedules of incidents, non-molestation order paperwork, Cafcass preparation, hearing documents and the clear presentation of patterns of coercive or controlling behaviour.

If your evidence currently feels scattered, overwhelming or difficult to explain, the first step is often to turn individual incidents into a clear, dated and properly evidenced pattern.

Sources and further reading

• Volusia County: Florida’s first county-operated Domestic Violence Offender Database
• Central Florida Public Media: Volusia council vote and final database scope
• Tennessee Bureau of Investigation: Persistent Domestic Violence Offender Registry
• Tennessee Public Chapter 520: Savanna’s Law
• Domestic Abuse Act 2021, section 77
• Home Office: Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme statutory guidance
• GOV.UK: Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme factsheet
• Government action plan: Freedom from violence and abuse
• Domestic Abuse Commissioner: Shifting the Scales
• University of Essex: Research on a domestic abuse and stalking offender register

Legal information notice: This article provides general legal and policy information relating to England and Wales. It does not constitute legal advice. The discussion of Florida and Tennessee is comparative commentary only. Domestic abuse cases are fact-sensitive, and appropriate safeguarding or legal action will depend upon the circumstances.

About the author: Jessica Susan Hill is the founder of JSH Law, a legal consultant and family justice commentator with a particular interest in domestic abuse, coercive control, safeguarding, evidence analysis, access to justice and practical support for litigants in person.