What Did the Child See? Domestic Abuse, Fear and the Misuse of Parental Alienation in Family Court

When a child is frightened of a parent who abused their mother, that fear must not be treated as proof that somebody else put it there. It may be the child’s own response to what they saw, heard and lived through. The legal framework in England and Wales already recognises that reality. The continuing problem is whether the Family Court identifies and applies it consistently.

The law does not treat the child as a bystander

The starting point is section 3 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. Where one adult behaves abusively towards another, a related child is recognised as a victim of domestic abuse if the child:

• sees the abuse;
• hears the abuse; or
• experiences its effects.

That third category matters. A child does not need to be standing in the same room, watching a physical assault, before the law recognises victimhood. A child may hear threats through a wall, see injuries or distress afterwards, live in an atmosphere of intimidation, change their behaviour to avoid provoking the abusive parent, or experience the effect of abuse on the care available from the parent being harmed.

The statutory language is broader than the everyday word “witness”. It captures children who live inside the consequences.

The Children Act 1989 also defines harm to include impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another. In private-law proceedings, the child’s welfare is paramount under section 1, and the welfare checklist requires the court to consider harm the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering.

Practice Direction 12J, which governs child-arrangements cases involving domestic abuse and harm, is explicit. Paragraph 4 says domestic abuse is harmful to children, or puts them at risk, including where they witness abuse between their parents or live in a home in which it is perpetrated—even if they are too young to be conscious of the behaviour.

This is not peripheral guidance. PD12J tells the court how domestic abuse must be identified, tried where necessary, assessed and connected to any decision about where a child lives or with whom the child spends time.

Why Proudman’s question matters

Proudman ends her post with a deceptively simple question: “What did they see?”

Legally, the complete inquiry is wider:

• What did the child see or hear?
• What effects of the abuse did the child experience?
• What did the child understand at the time?
• What have they learned about safety, power and consequences inside the home?
• How did the abusive behaviour affect their relationship with each parent?
• What harm has already occurred?
• What risk would arise before, during or after future contact?

A child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent is not, by itself, proof of the cause. But neither is it an evidential blank that professionals may fill with an assumption about the other parent. The cause must be investigated rather than guessed.

Sometimes a child may have been manipulated. Sometimes their response may arise from ordinary alignment, attachment, loyalty conflict, separation anxiety, developmental factors or poor parenting. Sometimes the child may be making a justified response to abuse of themselves or of the other parent. More than one factor may operate at once.

The court’s task is not to select the most convenient adult narrative. It is to determine the facts needed for a safe welfare decision.

How the frame can shift from harm to blame

The dangerous reframing identified by Proudman works like this:

1. A mother reports domestic abuse or coercive control.
2. The child is frightened, distressed at handover, refuses contact or becomes dysregulated after contact.
3. The father says the mother has influenced, coached or “alienated” the child.
4. The inquiry shifts away from his behaviour and towards her parenting.
5. Protective conduct is recast as obstruction, hostility or failure to promote contact.
6. The child’s words become evidence against the parent to whom they disclosed rather than evidence requiring investigation.

The Domestic Abuse Act is gender-neutral, and abuse, protective behaviour and psychological manipulation can arise in different family configurations. Proudman’s post addresses the mother–father pattern repeatedly reported in domestic-abuse litigation. The wider principle applies regardless of the sex of the victim or alleged perpetrator: the court must not substitute a stereotype for evidence.

What the Family Justice Council guidance now requires

The Family Justice Council’s December 2024 guidance on allegations of alienating behaviour provides an important safeguard against diagnostic shortcuts.

First, it states that “parental alienation syndrome” has no evidential basis. The relevant question is not whether somebody can attach a label to the child or parent. It is what particular behaviour occurred in this particular family, whether it affected the child, and how.

Second, the guidance requires three elements before a court can conclude that alienating behaviours occurred:

1. The child is reluctant, resistant or refusing to engage in a relationship with a parent or carer.
2. That response is not caused by the conduct of that parent towards the child or the other parent, and is not explained by another factor such as attachment, affinity, alignment or a justified rejection.
3. The other parent engaged in behaviour that directly or indirectly affected the child and caused the reluctance, resistance or refusal.

The order of that analysis is vital. A child’s refusal establishes only the first element. It cannot prove manipulation. Before blame is placed on the other parent, the court must rule in or rule out justified rejection, harmful parenting, exposure to abuse and other explanations—and must then identify evidence of conduct that actually caused the child’s response.

The guidance also recognises:

• allegations of alienating behaviour are often raised in response to allegations of domestic abuse;
• concerns exist that such allegations can be used as post-separation control or as a litigation tactic to silence adult and child survivors;
• reluctance, resistance or refusal is not itself evidence of psychological manipulation;
• children can reach their own conclusions about what happened in their family;
• a child’s response may be an appropriate and justified rejection caused by harmful parenting or exposure to abuse; and
• protective behaviour by a parent is not the same thing as alienating behaviour.

Protective behaviour is not automatically “alienating”

A parent who changes a handover, asks for supervision, reports a disclosure, seeks a fact-finding hearing, objects to overnight contact or supports a child who is afraid may be acting protectively. They may also be mistaken about risk. The answer depends on evidence and context.

The safe analytical question is not simply, “Did this parent promote contact?” It is:

• What risk did the parent believe existed?
• What evidence or history informed that belief?
• Was the response proportionate to the perceived risk?
• What did the child say or demonstrate, in their own words and behaviour?
• Was safer contact realistically available?
• Did the alleged perpetrator acknowledge the harm, accept responsibility and demonstrate sustained change?

The Family Justice Council guidance says alienating behaviour should not be found where established domestic abuse caused the child’s justified rejection, the parent’s protective behaviour or the victim parent’s traumatic response.

That does not exempt any parent from scrutiny. It ensures the scrutiny starts in the right place.

Domestic abuse must be assessed as a pattern, not a collection of snapshots

In Re H-N and Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448, the Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of understanding patterns of coercive or controlling behaviour and their cumulative effect.

One incident may look trivial when removed from its history. A message, a late handover, a threat disguised as a joke, monitoring, financial control or undermining may acquire a very different meaning when placed inside a sustained pattern of domination and fear.

The same is true of the child’s response. A contact session may appear calm when observed for two hours, while the child experiences anxiety in advance, distress afterwards or fear about what will happen to the other parent. The welfare analysis must extend beyond the visible contact session.

Re H-N also makes clear that harm is not limited to direct violence against a child. Coercive or controlling behaviour may harm a child through what they experience or witness, through the atmosphere of fear in the home, or through its effect on the parenting capacity of the adult victim.

A striking August 2026 example: Re CX (No 2)

The very recent judgment in Re CX (No 2) (Domestic Abuse: No Contact) [2026] EWFC 230 demonstrates why the effect of abuse on the parent caring for the child is part of the child’s welfare—not a separate adult issue.

The six-year-old child loved her father and enjoyed contact with him. There had been around 200 hours of positive supervised contact, followed by an order intended to progress arrangements. The earlier court had nevertheless found that the parents’ relationship was characterised by extreme emotional and psychological abuse of the mother by the father.

Expert evidence in the later proceedings established that the mother had Complex PTSD arising from that abuse. Contact-related arrangements continued to trigger her trauma. The problem did not exist only during handover or during the child’s time with the father. Preparing the child, anticipating contact, worrying while the child was away and managing the aftermath all maintained the mother’s sense of threat.

Mr Justice Garrido carefully acknowledged the real harm that stopping contact would cause the child. She could experience confusion, distress, anger and a sense of abandonment. The court did not pretend that “no contact” was harmless or merely a short pause.

However, every realistic alternative had been examined, including supervision, controlled handovers and reduced frequency. The judge concluded that continuing contact created an appreciable risk that the mother would become unable to maintain the high standard of care she provided. That could cause the child significant and unmanageable harm. The court therefore ordered the immediate cessation of direct and indirect contact, alongside a three-year section 91(14) restriction on further applications without permission.

The case was exceptional and evidence-heavy. It is not authority for an automatic end to contact whenever a parent experiences trauma. Its importance lies in the chain of welfare reasoning:

1. The domestic abuse caused serious and continuing trauma to the mother.
2. The contact system maintained the trauma triggers.
3. That prevented effective recovery.
4. The mother was the child’s primary attachment figure and day-to-day carer.
5. Deterioration in her capacity would seriously harm the child.
6. Safety during the contact session could not, by itself, manage the wider risk.

The implementation gap is now documented

The most uncomfortable point is that the legal rules are not new. The difficulty is implementation.

The Domestic Abuse Commissioner’s October 2025 report, Everyday Business, reviewed 298 closed child-arrangements files at three court sites, observed live hearings and interviewed professionals and survivors. It was a three-site pilot, not a census of every Family Court case, but its findings are too serious to dismiss.

The report also found that children’s objections to contact could be given little weight, that only 3% of files involved appointment of a children’s guardian under rule 16.4, and that survivors described being discouraged from pursuing domestic-abuse allegations because contact was expected to occur anyway.

That is the gap Proudman’s post exposes: the law recognises a child victim, but the system can still process the child as an obstacle to contact and the protective parent as the source of the obstacle.

What PD12J and Cafcass policy require in practice

PD12J requires the court to address domestic abuse at every stage. Among other things, the court must:

• identify the factual and welfare issues at the earliest opportunity;
• decide whether disputed allegations need a fact-finding hearing to provide a basis for risk and welfare assessment;
• consider the nature and degree of established abuse and its effect on the child and parents;
• ensure that any contact order does not expose the child or the parent with whom the child lives to an unmanageable risk of harm;
• consider physical and emotional safety before, during and after contact;
• consider the perpetrator’s insight, responsibility and likely future behaviour;
• consider whether court proceedings are being used to continue abuse; and
• explain how findings of domestic abuse influenced the child-arrangements decision.

The current Cafcass Domestic Abuse Practice Policy is similarly clear. It requires practitioners to listen to children and adults, assess harm and future risk, use their own words accurately, acknowledge the efforts of safe parents to protect children and give a clear, evidence-informed and compelling rationale before recommending that a child live with or spend time with a parent where domestic abuse and harm have been reported.

Cafcass policy also requires analysis of:

• the lifelong impact of domestic abuse on child and adult victims;
• the perpetrator’s recognition of the harm caused;
• whether responsibility has been accepted;
• whether change has been demonstrated and sustained over time;
• the safety and capacity of the parent expected to manage contact; and
• the evidence supporting a conclusion that the proposed arrangements are safe and in the child’s best interests.

A report that says only “the parents need to put conflict behind them” does not answer those questions. Domestic abuse is not mutual conflict merely because the parties disagree about it.

Practical points for litigants in person

If you are trying to present this issue without a lawyer, the strongest case is usually specific, child-focused and linked to the legal tests. Volume is not a substitute for relevance.

1. Preserve the child’s words; do not manufacture evidence

Record what the child spontaneously said, when they said it, who was present and what happened immediately before and afterwards. Use their words, not an adult translation. Avoid repeated, leading or suggestive questioning. A child should not be recruited to prove either parent’s case.

2. Describe impact, not only incidents

For each relevant event or pattern, explain the effect on the child. This may include changes in sleep, school attendance, behaviour, physical symptoms, handovers, emotional regulation, relationships or expressed wishes and feelings. Distinguish what you personally observed from what the child or another person told you.

3. Show the pattern without burying the court

Use a concise chronology and group examples under relevant themes such as intimidation, monitoring, threats, economic control, undermining, post-separation conduct or use of the proceedings. Explain why selected examples show a wider pattern and how that pattern relates to present risk and welfare.

4. Ask for the issue to be identified and recorded

If domestic abuse is relevant, ask the court to record that it is an issue under PD12J and to identify what factual and welfare questions must be determined. If the court decides a fact-finding hearing is unnecessary, PD12J requires the order to record the reasons.

5. Ask focused questions of a section 7 assessment

Depending on the case, the court may need Cafcass or the local authority to address:

• the child’s experience as a potential victim under section 3 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;
• the child’s wishes and feelings and how they were obtained;
• harm already suffered and risk of future harm;
• the impact of abuse on the child’s relationship with each parent;
• the effect of the proposed arrangements on the safety and parenting capacity of the parent with care;
• whether the alleged perpetrator demonstrates insight, responsibility and sustained change;
• whether direct, supervised, supported, indirect or no contact is safe and beneficial; and
• what evidence supports each recommendation.

6. Require precision if “alienation” is alleged

Ask which conduct is said to amount to psychological manipulation, when it occurred, what evidence proves it and how it caused the child’s response. Ask how the three Family Justice Council elements are said to be satisfied. Ask what other explanations were considered, including abuse, justified rejection, protective behaviour, trauma, attachment and alignment.

7. Ask the court to connect findings to the order

PD12J paragraph 40 requires the court to explain how its domestic-abuse findings affected the child-arrangements decision. Where abuse is proved but contact is ordered, the court must explain why the order is beneficial and will not expose the child to harm.

8. Protect the child’s privacy

Family proceedings are generally private and strict rules govern publication and sharing of information. Do not post court papers, identifying details, recordings or the child’s account online. Obtain case-specific advice before sharing information from proceedings.

Reform in 2026: movement, but not completion

There are signs of structural movement. In March 2026 the Government announced the wider rollout of the investigative model formerly known as Pathfinder and now described as Child Focused Courts. The model is intended to improve information-sharing between courts, police, local authorities and domestic-abuse services, reduce delay and give children a more central voice.

The Government’s June 2026 response to the Domestic Abuse Commissioner also accepted further monitoring, revisions to the C1A allegations-of-harm form and continued national rollout of the Child Focused Court model.

The Government has also introduced legislation to repeal the statutory presumption of parental involvement in section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989. That is significant, but legal accuracy matters: as at 26 August 2026, the repeal is not yet in force. Clause 17 of the Courts and Tribunals Bill would remove the presumption, but the Bill remains at Commons report stage with a date still to be announced. Current cases remain governed by the existing law, including the rebuttable presumption and the safeguarding qualifications in PD12J.

Removing a statutory presumption may change the legal starting point. It will not, by itself, eliminate:

• poor recognition of coercive control;
• the treatment of abuse as “historic” or irrelevant after separation;
• unsafe pressure to agree contact;
• inadequate section 7 analysis;
• the sidelining of children’s voices;
• unfounded assumptions about protective parents; or
• labels replacing evidence.

Rules matter. Training, resources, specialist assessment, judicial continuity, accountability and the discipline to apply those rules matter just as much.

The question must begin with the child’s experience

Dr Charlotte Proudman’s post deserves attention because it exposes a basic inversion.

A child sees intimidation, hears threats, watches a parent being controlled or lives with the consequences. The child becomes frightened and resists contact. The system then risks asking whether the abused parent created the fear.

That may be one hypothesis to test. It must never be the automatic explanation.

The law already supplies the correct starting point: a child who sees, hears or experiences the effects of domestic abuse is a victim. Their fear may be a response to their own lived experience. Protective action may be safeguarding rather than obstruction. The impact of abuse on the parent providing day-to-day care may be inseparable from the child’s welfare.

So the first question should not be, “Who turned this child against a parent?”

It should be: What did this child see, hear and experience—and what must now be done to keep them safe?

Sources and further reading

• Dr Charlotte Proudman, public Facebook post, 26 August 2026; see Dr Proudman’s public Facebook page.
• Charlotte Proudman, He Said, She Said: Truth, Trauma and the Struggle for Justice in Family Court (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2025).
• Domestic Abuse Act 2021, section 3: children as victims of domestic abuse.
• Children Act 1989, section 1 and section 31(9).
• Family Procedure Rules 2010, Practice Direction 12J: Child Arrangements and Contact Orders—Domestic Abuse and Harm.
• Family Justice Council, Guidance on Responding to a Child’s Unexplained Reluctance, Resistance or Refusal to Spend Time with a Parent and Allegations of Alienating Behaviour (December 2024).
• Re H-N and Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448.
• Re C (‘Parental Alienation’; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam).
• Re CX (No 2) (Domestic Abuse: No Contact) [2026] EWFC 230.
• Domestic Abuse Commissioner, Everyday Business: Addressing Domestic Abuse and Continuing Harm Through a Family Court Review and Reporting Mechanism (October 2025).
• Cafcass Domestic Abuse Practice Policy (reissued December 2025).
• Ministry of Justice, national rollout of Child Focused Courts (17 March 2026).
• Courts and Tribunals Bill: current Parliamentary stages, checked 26 August 2026.

Regulatory and editorial notice

This article is published by JSH Law Ltd for general information, public legal education and commentary concerning the law of England and Wales. It is not legal advice and must not be relied upon as a substitute for advice from a qualified solicitor, barrister or other authorised legal professional about an individual case.

Every family case turns on its own evidence, procedural history, safeguarding information, court findings and welfare considerations. References to mothers and fathers reflect the issue discussed in Dr Proudman’s post and do not alter the gender-neutral application of the legislation.

JSH Law Ltd provides litigation support and McKenzie Friend services to litigants in person. JSH Law Ltd is not authorised or regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority or another approved legal-services regulator, does not conduct litigation or carry out reserved legal activities, and has no automatic right of audience. Any court assistance is subject to the limits of the McKenzie Friend role and the court’s permission.

Law, procedure, policy and online links change. Legal and policy status in this article was checked on 26 August 2026.