Jack and Paul’s Law: Ending the Presumption of Parental Involvement in Family Court

What is Jack and Paul’s Law?

Jack and Paul’s Law is the campaign name used for the proposed repeal of the statutory presumption of parental involvement. It is named in memory of Jack and Paul Sykes, Claire Throssell MBE’s sons, who were killed by their father in a fire during court-ordered contact in 2014. Claire’s sustained campaigning has challenged the assumption that parental contact is inherently safe or beneficial in every case.

The Government committed to repeal following its 2025 review. The measure appears in the Courts and Tribunals Bill. It was Clause 17 at the Commons stage, but is Clause 16 in HL Bill 57, as brought from the Commons to the Lords on 14 October 2026. That renumbering explains why recent social-media reports, Parliamentary speeches and legal updates may cite different clauses.

Clause 16 proposes to omit Children Act 1989 sections 1(2A), 1(2B), 1(6) and 1(7), together with the related amendment provision in the Children and Families Act 2014. The Commons completed its stages on 13 October 2026. The Lords second reading is scheduled for 27 October 2026. The Bill is not an Act and the repeal has not come into force. See Parliament’s live Bill record.

Even after any Royal Assent, the Bill’s commencement clause currently requires regulations made by the Lord Chancellor to bring this repeal into force. There may also be transitional arrangements. No one should assume that a parliamentary vote immediately alters an existing child arrangements order.

What does the existing presumption actually mean?

Under section 1 of the Children Act 1989, the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration. The presumption in subsection 1(2A), introduced in 2014, directs a court in specified situations to presume that involvement of a qualifying parent will further the child’s welfare unless the contrary is shown. It is expressly qualified by provisions concerning the risk of harm.

Involvement is not the same as equal parenting time. Section 1(2B) defines involvement as direct or indirect and does not impose any division of a child’s time. The presumption is rebuttable. It is not an automatic entitlement to contact, shared care or overnight stays, and it does not displace the child’s welfare or existing domestic-abuse safeguards.

When the welfare checklist applies, the court considers relevant factors including wishes and feelings in light of the child’s age and understanding, emotional and educational needs, the likely impact of change, harm suffered or risked, and parental capacity to meet the child’s needs. The checklist is not a competition between parental entitlements.

Why does the Government want to repeal it?

The Ministry of Justice review, published on 22 October 2025 following the earlier Harm Panel work, found that the statutory presumption was one factor contributing to a broader pro-contact culture. Its research raised concerns about contact outcomes in cases involving abusive behaviour or the risk of harm. But the review did not establish that the presumption was the sole or even dominant cause of unsafe decisions.

That distinction matters. A legal starting assumption can shape professional language and litigation choices, but genuinely safer outcomes also depend on how the court identifies coercive control, understands patterns rather than disconnected incidents, makes necessary findings, assesses risk, explains its decisions and ensures that orders work in practice.

Kate Kniveton’s case: findings, contact and protective orders

Former MP Kate Kniveton’s case illustrates why established abuse, emotional harm and prolonged litigation must be addressed in the welfare analysis. The relevant published judgment is Griffiths v Kniveton & Anor [2024] EWHC 199 (Fam), handed down by Mrs Justice Lieven on 2 February 2024. Dr Charlotte Proudman represented Kate Kniveton; Andrew Griffiths represented himself. See the approved High Court judgment.

After a four-day hearing, HHJ Williscroft gave a fact-finding judgment on 26 November 2020 containing very serious civil findings against Mr Griffiths, including rape and coercive and controlling behaviour. These were findings made by the Family Court using the civil standard of proof. They must not be presented as criminal convictions.

At the 2024 welfare hearing the father sought supervised direct contact, moving towards unsupervised contact. Mrs Justice Lieven examined expert evidence, the child’s relationship with the father, his understanding of the findings, the continuing effects of abuse on the mother, and the consequences for the child of more than four years of proceedings.

What did the High Court decide?

• No direct contact at the time: the judge considered only letterbox contact appropriate on the welfare evidence (paragraph 54).
• Section 91(14) for three years: a permission requirement before specified further applications, designed to give the mother and child respite from further proceedings (paragraphs 58–62).
• Related welfare measures: the judgment also addresses parental responsibility, prohibited steps and the child’s surname. These require reading in their exact terms; they were not an extinction of every parental right.
• No costs order: the mother’s costs application was rejected for the reasons at paragraphs 66–67.

It is equally important to record what the judge did not find: she expressly declined to hold that Mr Griffiths had knowingly used the litigation as further coercive control (paragraphs 51 and 59). The judgment criticises his limited understanding of the impact of proceedings, but does not support indiscriminate use of that additional allegation as if it were an established finding.

The court acknowledged that the child had enjoyed contact and that the father-child relationship mattered. Nevertheless, it considered that the mother’s distress following established abuse and lengthy litigation affected the child’s welfare. It did not treat a finding of direct physical danger to the child as the sole gateway to protective decisions. The outcome was individual to the evidence, not a blanket rule that all contact should end following an abuse finding.

Why could Kate speak publicly about the proceedings?

The publication dispute must be distinguished from the later welfare judgment. Journalists Louise Tickle and Brian Farmer sought permission to publish the family court findings, supported by Kate Kniveton. Mrs Justice Lieven permitted identification of the parents in Tickle v Griffiths [2021] EWHC 3365 (Fam), while protecting the child’s identity. Andrew Griffiths unsuccessfully appealed in Griffiths v Tickle [2021] EWCA Civ 1882.

The courts balanced open justice and freedom of expression against privacy and protection of the child. The result was case-specific. It does not give other parents permission to publish confidential family court documents, identifying details of children or material contrary to reporting restrictions. Kate later spoke publicly about her experiences, including in ITV’s Breaking the Silence: Kate’s Story.

What can parents and litigants in person do under the law today?

Parents who raise abuse or safeguarding concerns do not have to wait for parliamentary repeal. Practice Direction 12J sets out the approach to domestic abuse where child arrangements or contact are before the court. It covers allegations, admissions and other reasons to believe abuse may have occurred, together with questions of risk, case management, findings and safe orders.

The court must consider whether disputed allegations need to be determined through a fact-finding hearing. Such a hearing is not automatic in every case. The decision must be connected to the facts necessary for the welfare determination and the requirements of fairness and proportionality.

JSH Law’s six-question evidence check

A practical preparation framework; not a statutory legal test.

1. What is the actual order? Obtain the latest sealed version; distinguish contact obligations, conditions and restrictions.
2. What exactly is alleged? Identify behaviour and dates, but also patterns, context and specific relevance to the child’s welfare.
3. What is established? Keep allegations, admissions, records of disclosures, professional opinions and judicial findings separate.
4. How has the child been affected? Consider physical and emotional harm, the child’s actual experience and any impact on the primary carer.
5. What procedure is needed? A direction, safeguarding assessment, fact-finding decision, protective measure or variation application may be relevant.
6. What order is realistically sought? State the proposed safe arrangements and why they meet the child’s individual needs.

Where appropriate, allegations of harm may be recorded in Form C1A as part of a relevant application or response. New applications to make, vary or discharge section 8 child orders are generally associated with Form C100. The procedural route, any permission requirements, MIAM exemptions and confidentiality measures must be checked in the circumstances of the case. Filing an application does not automatically suspend an existing order.

Immediate safety is different from ordinary procedural disagreement. Where a child or adult faces immediate danger, seek urgent appropriate protection and specialist legal advice. Do not assume proposed legislation has displaced a current order; equally, safeguarding risks should not be left unaddressed simply because reform is pending.

For related guidance, see JSH Law’s analysis of the IDAS Family Court Report 2026 and its guide to inaccurate safeguarding records.

Frequently asked questions

Has Jack and Paul’s Law been passed?

No. As at 25 October 2026 the repeal remains in the Courts and Tribunals Bill, awaiting further Parliamentary stages and, if enacted, commencement regulations.

Does repeal mean that an abusive parent can never see a child?

No automatic prohibition is proposed. The court must assess the actual risk and the welfare of the individual child, taking account of findings, evidence and possible safeguards.

Will it remove parental responsibility?

No. Parental responsibility is a separate legal status. Any restrictions or changes require their own legal basis.

Will my current child arrangements order be cancelled?

No. Repeal alone does not cancel existing orders. Applications to vary, discharge or protect require the correct legal route and evidence.

What if there has been domestic abuse but no criminal conviction?

A criminal conviction is not the only possible source of relevant evidence in family proceedings. The court may make civil findings after appropriate consideration of admissible evidence and procedural fairness.

Can I publish my own family court judgment?

Do not assume so. Publication depends on applicable reporting restrictions, confidentiality law and any specific judicial permission. The transparency outcome in the Kniveton litigation was particular to that case.

Primary legal sources and further reading

• Parliament’s live Bill record
• HL Bill 57, Clause 16 and commencement provisions
• section 1 of the Children Act 1989
• Ministry of Justice review
• Ministry of Justice: Courts and Tribunals Bill factsheet
• the approved High Court judgment — Griffiths v Kniveton [2024] EWHC 199 (Fam)
• Griffiths v Tickle [2021] EWCA Civ 1882
• Practice Direction 12J

Also see JSH Law’s guide to stopped contact for a distinct but related child arrangements issue.