Tag Archive for: Courts and Tribunals Bill

What changed on 4 October 2026?

The Government announced that it would scrap the wider proposal for a new Crown Court Bench Division hearing certain lower-level cases by judge alone.

More serious Crown Court cases will therefore continue to be tried before juries.

But judge-alone criminal trials have not disappeared from the reform package altogether.

The Government still intends to allow some suitably technical and lengthy fraud and financial cases to be tried by a judge alone.

So “judge-alone trials have been scrapped” is too broad. The wider expansion has been abandoned. A narrower exception remains.

Seven things the headlines may miss

1. The criminal courts are not simply returning to the status quo.
The Government still intends to remove a defendant’s ability to insist upon Crown Court trial for an either-way offence where the magistrates’ court accepts jurisdiction.

2. Magistrates could gain substantially greater sentencing powers.
The Bill contains powers capable of extending custodial sentencing jurisdiction to 18 or 24 months.

3. Some judge-alone trials remain.
Technical and exceptionally lengthy fraud and financial cases remain part of the proposed reforms.

4. Criminal appeals are also being restructured.
The Bill currently proposes a permission stage for appeals from magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court and an end to the automatic full rehearing model.

5. The Bill changes evidence and special measures too.
There are provisions relating to vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, screens, professional supporters, pre-recorded evidence and aspects of sexual-offence evidence.

6. The Bill contains a major Family Court reform.
It proposes repeal of the statutory presumption of parental involvement from section 1 Children Act 1989.

7. Court modernisation is wider than this Bill.
AI-assisted listing, virtual hearings and investment in court technology form part of the Government’s broader response to court delay.

What exactly has the Government U-turned on?

The original Courts and Tribunals Bill proposed a new tier within the Crown Court known as the Bench Division.

Under that model, certain triable either-way cases expected to attract a sentence of three years or less could have been heard in the Crown Court by a judge sitting alone rather than a judge and jury.

The Government argued that judge-alone trials would be quicker and would release Crown Court capacity for more serious cases.

The proposal quickly became one of the most controversial parts of the Bill.

On 4 October, the Justice Secretary announced that the Government had heard the strength of feeling surrounding the proposal and would change course.

The wider Bench Division model will therefore be removed from the Government’s programme when amendments are brought forward.

That matters constitutionally and practically.

Trial by jury has never applied to every criminal case in England and Wales.

But the Bench Division would have moved a significant additional category of existing Crown Court work into judge-alone determination.

That wider shift is now being abandoned.

What is actually law today?

This distinction matters.

A Government announcement is not the same thing as an enacted statute.

The Courts and Tribunals Bill remains before Parliament.

As at 5 October 2026, it has not received Royal Assent.

The Bill’s Report Stage in the House of Commons is currently scheduled for 13 October 2026.

Until the relevant legislation is passed and brought into force:

• the existing criminal court rules continue to apply;
• defendants retain their present statutory rights;
• the current Children Act 1989 provisions remain operative;
• and proposed reforms should not be treated as though they are already law.

This sounds obvious.

But periods of rapid legal reform create a recurring problem:

policy announcement, Bill, enacted law and commenced law are four different legal states.

They should not be collapsed into one another.

Jury trial has been protected — but defendants may still lose the right to choose it

This is probably the most important detail lost in the U-turn headlines.

There are broadly three categories of criminal offence:

• summary-only offences, ordinarily dealt with in the magistrates’ court;
• triable either-way offences, which may be dealt with in either the magistrates’ court or Crown Court depending upon the circumstances;
• indictable-only offences, which are dealt with in the Crown Court.

Under the current law, where magistrates accept jurisdiction for an either-way offence, the defendant can nevertheless elect trial in the Crown Court.

The Government still proposes to remove that right.

Under the proposed model, the court would determine the appropriate venue based upon factors including seriousness and complexity.

The Government’s 4 October announcement expressly confirms that courts will have the final say over where lower-level cases should be heard.

The Government has stepped back from removing juries from a wider category of Crown Court cases. It has not stepped back from removing a defendant’s ability to insist upon Crown Court jury trial in some either-way cases.

That is still a substantial change.

The argument for it is efficiency.

The argument against it concerns procedural choice, public confidence and the constitutional significance traditionally attached to jury trial.

Those competing questions deserve more scrutiny than the phrase:

“jury trials saved”.

Magistrates could receive much greater sentencing powers

The reform programme also proposes expanding magistrates’ sentencing jurisdiction.

The current Bill provides mechanisms capable of increasing maximum custodial powers to:

• 18 months; or
• 24 months,

for relevant either-way offences.

The Government confirmed on 4 October that longer magistrates’ sentencing powers remain part of its strategy.

The policy objective is straightforward.

If magistrates can retain and sentence a wider range of cases, fewer cases need Crown Court capacity.

But moving cases out of one overloaded jurisdiction does not make the workload disappear.

It transfers it.

That means the reform also depends upon the capacity of:

• magistrates’ courts;
• District Judges;
• legal advisers;
• advocates;
• probation services;
• court staff;
• and the wider criminal justice system.

The correct question is therefore not only:

“Will this reduce the Crown Court backlog?”

It is:

“Where does the pressure move next?”

Judge-alone trials have not disappeared completely

The U-turn does not apply to every proposed judge-alone trial.

The Government still intends to permit certain technical and lengthy fraud and financial cases to be heard by a judge sitting without a jury.

Under the current proposal, eligibility is restricted.

The case must involve specified fraud or related financial offences and meet requirements associated with exceptional complexity or length.

The court would then decide whether the matter was suitably technical and lengthy and whether a jury trial remained in the public interest.

The policy argument is that exceptionally complex fraud trials may consume months of jury time and substantial Crown Court capacity.

A judge sitting alone can also provide a reasoned judgment explaining the basis for conviction or acquittal.

But serious questions remain.

Fraud remains criminal prosecution by the state.

Defendants may still face substantial imprisonment.

And complexity alone does not necessarily establish that ordinary citizens are incapable of understanding evidence when it is presented properly.

The Government has therefore retreated from the broad judge-alone model while preserving a much narrower one.

The proposed criminal appeal reforms may be just as significant

The Bill also proposes substantial changes to appeals from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court.

Under the existing system, a defendant generally has an automatic right to appeal conviction or sentence to the Crown Court, with the appeal proceeding by way of rehearing.

The Bill currently proposes replacing that model with:

• a requirement for permission to appeal;
• a judicial review of whether the appeal should proceed;
• a hearing limited to the issues for which permission has been granted;
• and audio recording of magistrates’ court trial and sentencing proceedings.

The Government says this would prevent unnecessary appeals, reduce repeated evidence from victims and witnesses and release Crown Court capacity.

But an appeal is not simply another piece of court workload.

It is part of the justice system’s machinery for identifying and correcting error.

That means efficiency and error correction have to be considered together.

The Bill is also about evidence and participation

Not every reform is about moving cases through the system faster.

The Bill contains measures aimed at the experience of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses and at reducing the influence of myths and misconceptions in sexual-offence proceedings.

Current proposals include reforms concerning:

• certain evidence about previous allegations;
• certain evidence concerning compensation;
• courtroom screens;
• a professional supporter accompanying some vulnerable or intimidated witnesses;
• exclusion of people from the courtroom in appropriate circumstances;
• editing pre-recorded cross-examination;
• and application of special measures to victim personal statements.

These provisions illustrate an important point.

Justice reform is not only about throughput.

It is also about participation.

A system which finishes a case quickly but prevents a vulnerable person from giving their best evidence has not necessarily become fairer.

There is also a major Family Court reform inside this Bill

For JSH Law readers, one of the most important provisions has almost nothing to do with criminal trials.

The Courts and Tribunals Bill proposes repealing the statutory presumption of parental involvement from section 1 of the Children Act 1989.

The current provision requires the court, in specified circumstances, to presume unless the contrary is shown that the involvement of a parent in the child’s life will further the child’s welfare.

The Government’s review concluded that the presumption was one of a number of factors contributing to what it described as a pro-contact culture within the Family Court.

The Bill therefore proposes removing it.

There has been no indication in the 4 October announcement that this reform is being abandoned.

So while political attention is focused upon criminal juries, the Bill still contains a potentially significant change to private children law.

Repealing the presumption does not create an anti-contact presumption

This is important.

The proposed repeal would not mean that:

• contact with a parent becomes presumptively harmful;
• parents lose parental responsibility;
• courts will routinely stop contact;
• a domestic-abuse allegation automatically determines the outcome;
• or relationships with both parents cease to matter.

The central legal principle remains:

the child’s welfare is paramount.

The court would continue to apply the statutory welfare framework and consider matters including:

• the child’s wishes and feelings, considered in light of age and understanding;
• physical, emotional and educational needs;
• the likely effect of changes in circumstances;
• the child’s relevant characteristics;
• harm suffered or risk of harm;
• and the capability of relevant adults to meet the child’s needs.

The proposal is therefore better understood as removing a statutory starting assumption about parental involvement.

The proposed reform does not replace a pro-contact presumption with an anti-contact presumption. It places greater emphasis on evidence, safety and the individual child’s welfare.

For domestic-abuse and safeguarding cases, that distinction is particularly important.

The relevant question should be:

What arrangement, on the evidence in this individual case, best protects and promotes this child’s welfare?

Family Court law and procedure are changing quickly

JSH Law provides defined-scope practical support for litigants in person in private children proceedings in England and Wales.

Support can include:

• understanding current procedure;
• case analysis;
• evidence organisation;
• chronologies;
• position statements;
• witness-statement preparation support;
• Cafcass and Child Impact Report responses;
• domestic-abuse and safeguarding evidence;
• appeal paperwork;
• court-bundle preparation support;
• and hearing preparation or McKenzie Friend support where appropriate.

The aim is to identify what the court actually needs to decide and make the evidence easier to understand.

Book a consultation

The Bill also changes judicial leadership

The Courts and Tribunals Bill proposes reforms to the office of the Senior President of Tribunals.

The aim is closer structural alignment between courts and tribunals under the leadership of the Lady Chief Justice in England and Wales.

This forms part of the wider One Judiciary programme.

For most court users, institutional leadership may sound remote from everyday justice.

But structure affects:

• judicial deployment;
• training;
• workforce flexibility;
• administration;
• career pathways;
• and how future reform is implemented.

Modernisation changes not only legal rights.

It also changes the machinery administering them.

Why is the Government pursuing structural reform so aggressively?

The answer is delay.

On 4 October, the Ministry of Justice said the Crown Court open caseload had reached nearly 81,000 cases.

Almost one-third had been waiting for a year or longer.

That is not simply an administrative inconvenience.

Delay affects:

• victims;
• defendants;
• witnesses;
• lawyers;
• judges;
• court staff;
• prisons;
• police;
• and public confidence.

Memories deteriorate.

Witnesses disengage.

Victims remain in uncertainty.

Defendants may remain on bail or remand.

Cases become more expensive.

Justice delayed can become justice damaged.

No serious analysis should pretend the existing position is acceptable.

The harder question is:

which reforms reduce delay without weakening the protections that make the process just?

Artificial intelligence is explicitly part of the Government’s answer

This is where the reform programme becomes particularly relevant to JSH Law’s legal-technology work.

On 4 October, Courts Minister Sarah Sackman KC specifically referred to the use of AI to support case listing.

She also referred to:

• further use of virtual hearings;
• steps to ensure defendants arrive at court on time;
• and wider measures intended to improve efficiency.

Listing sounds administrative.

It is not entirely so.

Listing decisions determine:

• which case is heard when;
• which judge hears it;
• how courtrooms are allocated;
• how witnesses are coordinated;
• which urgent cases receive priority;
• and ultimately how delay is distributed across real people.

AI may be extremely useful in identifying clashes, modelling capacity and coordinating finite resources.

But there is a line between:

optimising a timetable

and:

deciding which human consequences deserve priority when there is not enough capacity for everyone.

Virtual hearings raise the same question

Remote hearings can improve access to justice.

They can reduce travel and cost.

They can make short procedural hearings more proportionate.

They may assist some disabled court users and people who would otherwise struggle to attend.

But remote does not automatically mean accessible.

For some participants, appearing from home may make the process easier.

For others it can make proceedings:

• harder to understand;
• more isolating;
• more technologically fragile;
• harder to communicate within;
• or unsafe where domestic abuse and coercive control are relevant.

The question should not simply be:

“Can we technically hold this hearing remotely?”

It should be:

“Can these participants engage effectively and fairly if we do?”

Efficiency is not legally neutral

Modern court reform uses a familiar vocabulary:

• efficiency;
• triage;
• capacity;
• optimisation;
• modernisation;
• streamlining;
• digitalisation;
• and productivity.

All of those can describe real improvements.

But every efficiency decision also decides where:

• time;
• attention;
• judicial scrutiny;
• procedural protection;
• and public resources

will be spent.

If a hearing becomes shorter, something is being removed or compressed.

If fewer cases reach the Crown Court, more cases remain elsewhere.

If an appeal requires permission, some appeals will stop before a full hearing.

If AI helps prioritise court listings, the criteria encoded into that process influence who waits.

If hearings move online, some participants gain accessibility and others may lose it.

None of this means efficiency is bad.

It means:

efficiency is itself a justice question.

Family justice should pay close attention to the criminal-court debate

The criminal courts and Family Court are different jurisdictions.

The legal tests are different.

The procedural rights are different.

But the institutional pressures are strikingly familiar.

Family justice is also being asked to:

• decide cases faster;
• identify issues earlier;
• reduce unnecessary hearings;
• use more digital systems;
• front-load information gathering;
• manage high numbers of litigants in person;
• and make difficult safeguarding decisions within finite resources.

The Child Focused Court model is part of that changing landscape.

So are Child Impact Reports and more intensive early information gathering.

Much of that may be positive.

But the jury-trial debate illustrates a wider principle:

Every structural reform should be tested against the procedural protection that may be lost when the system becomes faster.

In family proceedings that means asking:

• Has domestic abuse been properly identified?
• Have material factual disputes been determined where necessary?
• Has the child’s experience been properly considered?
• Can each party participate effectively?
• Have vulnerable parties received the required adjustments?
• Has early triage accidentally hardened an untested allegation into an assumption?
• Has speed displaced scrutiny?
• And does the eventual order rest upon evidence sufficiently tested for the consequence it carries?

A faster wrong decision is not better justice.

The parental-involvement repeal illustrates the tension particularly well

One part of the Bill is not principally designed to accelerate justice.

It changes the legal lens through which a Family Court decision is approached.

The proposed repeal followed longstanding concern that the parental-involvement presumption could contribute to a culture in which contact was treated as an expected outcome even where domestic abuse or safeguarding concerns required closer examination.

The reform effectively says:

do not allow a generalised assumption to do work that the individual welfare analysis should be doing.

There is a lesson there for the entire modernisation programme.

Systems need consistency.

Technology needs repeatable rules.

Courts need efficient processes.

But justice still requires individual judgment.

What should litigants in person take from all this?

Apply the JSH Law Six-Question Check to legal reform

The JSH Law Six-Question Check is useful here too.

The U-turn may actually make scrutiny of the rest of the Bill more important

The most controversial proposal dominated the debate.

Its removal could now allow the rest of the Bill to receive closer attention.

That is necessary.

Because this is not one reform.

It is part of a broader reorganisation of how justice is:

• allocated;
• heard;
• appealed;
• administered;
• digitised;
• and prioritised.

Some measures may be overdue.

Some may materially improve access to justice.

Some may release desperately needed capacity.

Others may exchange procedural protections for administrative efficiency.

The word modernisation does not answer which is which.

What, so what, now what?

What?

The Government has abandoned the proposed wider Crown Court Bench Division and its associated expansion of judge-alone trials.

But the Courts and Tribunals Bill and the wider court-modernisation programme continue.

So what?

The remaining reforms affect where defendants are tried, sentencing powers, criminal appeals, vulnerable witnesses, judicial structures, Family Court welfare law and the increasing use of technology inside the justice system.

The important debate was never only about juries.

Now what?

The Bill returns to the Commons on 13 October 2026.

The amendments matter.

That is when we should be able to compare the political announcement with the actual legislative wording.

And every reform should ultimately be tested against one question:

Does this merely make justice faster — or does it make justice work better?

Family Court procedure is changing. Your case still needs to be clear.

JSH Law provides practical, defined-scope support for litigants in person in private children proceedings in England and Wales.

Depending on scope, support can include:

• case analysis;
• chronologies and timelines;
• evidence organisation;
• witness-statement preparation support;
• position statements;
• domestic-abuse and safeguarding evidence;
• Cafcass and Child Impact Report responses;
• appeal paperwork;
• urgent documents;
• court-bundle preparation support;
• and hearing preparation or McKenzie Friend support where appropriate.

The purpose is not to produce more paperwork. It is to make the relevant evidence and issues easier for the court to identify and decide.

Book a consultation

Related JSH Law analysis

• Delay Is Not Administrative: What Family Justice Can Learn from the New Criminal Court Listing Framework
• Child Impact Reports and Child Focused Courts
• Domestic Abuse in the Family Court: What the IDAS Family Court Report 2026 Reveals
• AI Slop, Costs and Litigants in Person: Should Courts Sanction Bad AI Use?
• The JSH Law Six-Question Check

Primary and official sources

• Ministry of Justice — Justice reforms to be rolled out faster as Justice Secretary sets out changes to Courts Bill, 4 October 2026
• UK Parliament — Courts and Tribunals Bill
• Ministry of Justice — Courts and Tribunals Bill factsheet
• Children Act 1989, section 1 — Welfare of the Child